Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment by Timothy N. Cason et al.
KRANNERT SCHOOL OF 
MANAGEMENT 
 
  Purdue  University 
  West  Lafayette,  Indiana 
 
 





Timothy N. Cason 
Lata Gangadharan 
Pushkar Maitra 
Paper No. 1208 
Date:  March, 2008 
Institute for Research in the 
Behavioral, Economic, and 
















Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be 
attributed to the lack of information and inadequate collateral. One common feature of 
successful credit mechanisms is group-lending, where the loan is advanced to an individual if 
he/she is a part of a group and members of the borrowing group can monitor each other. 
Since group members have better information about each other compared to lenders, peer 
monitoring is often less expensive than lender monitoring. Theoretically this leads to greater 
monitoring and greater rates of loan repayments. This paper reports the results from a 
laboratory experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and (costly) peer 
monitoring. We compare peer monitoring treatments when credit is provided to members of 
the group sequentially and simultaneously, and individual lending with lender monitoring. 
The results depend on the relative cost of monitoring by the peer vis-à-vis the lender. In the 
more typical case where the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender 
monitoring, our results suggest that peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies, higher 
monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring. In the absence of 
monitoring cost differences, performance is mostly similar across group and individual 
lending schemes, although loan frequencies and monitoring rates are sometimes modestly 
greater with group lending. Within group lending, although the dynamic incentives provided 
by sequential leading generate the greatest equilibrium surplus, simultaneous group leading 
provides equivalent empirical performance.  
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There now exists a significant body of research that examines the failure of formal sector 
credit lending programs aimed at the poor in developing countries. Evidence of this failure is 
shown in the inability to reach target groups and low overall repayment rates. This failure is 
attributed primarily to asymmetric information (both adverse selection and moral hazard) and 
inadequate enforcement.
1  
The last few decades have, however, witnessed the development of innovative and 
highly successful mechanisms for the provision of credit to the poor. The most common of 
these is group-lending. Rather than the bank (or the lender) making a loan to an individual 
who is solely responsible for its repayment, the bank makes a loan to an individual who is a 
member of a group and the group is jointly liable for each member’s loans. In particular, if 
the group as a whole is unable to repay the loan because some members default on their 
repayment, all members of the group are ineligible for future credit. The Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh is possibly the most well known of such group lending programs. The repayment 
rate in this lending scheme is around 92 percent, and less than 5 percent of loan recipients 
were outside the target group (Morduch, 1999). The success of the Grameen Bank has led 
policy makers and NGO’s around the world to introduce similar schemes. Around 100 
million people are estimated to have participated in some form of a microfinance project (see 
Gine, Jakiela, Karlan and Morduch, 2005). The 2006 Nobel Prize for Peace to microfinance 
pioneer Muhammed Yunus has also put the success of microfinance in the world spotlight. 
Micro-lending is increasingly moving from non-profit towards a profit-making enterprise, 
with big banks such as Citigroup now backing such loans (Bellman, 2006).
2 
                                                 
1 For example, it has been argued that the percentage of ineligible beneficiaries in the Integrated Rural 
Development Program (IRDP) in India, one of the largest programs of provision of formal sector credit to the 
poor in the world, was between 15 and 26 percent, with the highest reported being 50 percent. The repayment 
rate for IRDP loans was only about 40 percent for the whole country (see Pulley, 1989). 
2 While microfinance programs are most widespread in less developed countries they are by no means confined 
to them. Microfinance programs have been introduced in transition economies like Bosnia and Russia and even   2
  The success of these group lending programs arises, in part, because they are better 
able to address the enforcement and informational problems that generally plague formal 
sector credit in developing countries. Group lending programs typically help solve the 
enforcement problem through peer monitoring. Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) argue that 
since group members are likely to have better information compared to an outsider (the 
bank), peer monitoring is relatively cheaper compared to bank monitoring, leading to greater 
monitoring and hence greater repayment. Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994) argue that 
explanations based on peer monitoring do a better job of explaining the success of group 
lending programs than other explanations. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) develop a model of 
moral hazard and monitoring and find that if the social sanctions are effective enough or if 
monitoring costs are low enough, the joint liability provided by group lending improves 
repayment rates. Chowdhury (2005), by contrast, is less optimistic. He finds that in the 
absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring, group lending programs will typically 
involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects.
3  
  The empirical evidence on these issues, unfortunately, is rather limited. The 
theoretical propositions and results are often supported by anecdotal evidence but these 
results have not been established as empirical regularities. In recent years researchers have 
called for well designed economic experiments to help examine the roles of various 
mechanisms that drive performance in microfinance programs (Morduch, 1999, Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  
The aim of this paper is to understand specific aspects of group lending schemes, 
using controlled experimental methods. We report the results from a laboratory experiment of 
                                                                                                                                                        
in developed countries like Australia, Canada and the US. See for example Conlin (1999), Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2000), Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Fry, Mihajilo, Russell and 
Brooks (2006).     
3 How group lending solves the problem of adverse selection is analysed by Ghatak (2000), Van Tassel (1999), 
Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000). The argument is based on endogenous group formation (and positive 
assortative matching): group lending with joint liability will result in self selection with safe borrowers clubbing 
together and screening out risky borrowers.   3
group lending in the presence of moral hazard and (costly) peer monitoring.
4 We compare 
treatments when credit is provided to members of the group sequentially and simultaneously, 
as well as treatments when loans are given to individuals and monitored by lenders. We also 
examine the importance of monitoring costs on credit market performance.  
Our work complements the growing body of research that can broadly be 
characterized as field experiments in microfinance (see for example Gine, Jakiela, Karlan and 
Morduch, 2005, Gine and Karlan, 2006, Kono, 2006, Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007). 
The laboratory approach that we use in this paper can address issues in different ways 
compared to field experiments. It is difficult to vary specific properties of institutions in 
controlled experiments in the field due to problems of replicability, data accessibility and 
comparability (see for example Bolnik, 1988 and Hulme, 2000). Furthermore some relevant 
variables, such as actual monitoring costs, remain unobserved. The laboratory approach on 
the other hand can help us control for specific parameters and observe behavior in simulated 
microfinance institutions. In our case it can help in isolating and clarifying the impact of 
different design features on repayment rates and project choice, by implementing an 
environment that is carefully aligned with the theoretical models relating to moral hazard and 
peer monitoring in microfinance programs. Of course, the laboratory approach has some 
drawbacks. For example, while the laboratory experiment included human subject behavior, 
the subjects are university students making decisions for relatively low stakes.
5 In field 
experiments, by contrast, participants are often the actual borrowers who are involved in 
microfinance programs. This advantage of field experiments comes at the cost of some loss 
of experimental control, however. For example, spillover effects could exist from one village 
to another or from the treatment group to the control group, creating more noise in the data. 
                                                 
4 In this paper, we focus on informational asymmetries due to moral hazard and not due to adverse selection. In 
particular we restrict ourselves to exogenously formed groups (with random re-matching) and leave the issue of 
endogenous group formation (positive assortative matching) for future research. 
5 We do, however, employ subjects both from a developed (Australia) and a developing (India) country to 
measure possible subject pool effects, and find virtually none.   4
Laboratory experiments that examine the impact of specific design features on 
performance of microfinance models are rare. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2006) and 
Seddiki and Ayedi (2005) both examine the role of group selection in the context of group 
lending. Both experiments are designed as investment games where each group member 
invests in an individual risky project whose outcome is known only to the individual, and 
both find that self-selected groups have a greater willingness to contribute. Neither of these 
papers analyze the role of peer monitoring. 
  Our experiment examines several aspects of group lending programs. The first is the 
argument that sequential lending is crucial to the success of group lending schemes. The 
Grameen Bank, for example, adopts this kind of a lending policy: groups have five members 
each and loans are initially given to two randomly chosen members, to be repaid in regular 
installments over a period of one year. If they pay their initial installments, then two more 
borrowers in the group receive the loan and so on. Ray (1998) argues that this kind of 
sequential lending minimizes the contagion effect associated with individual default. 
Sequential lending can also minimize the potential of coordination failure. Chowdhury (2005) 
and Aniket (2006) argue that in a simultaneous group lending scheme with joint liability and 
costly monitoring, peer monitoring by borrowers alone is insufficient and that sequential 
lending that incorporates dynamic incentives is required.
6 Our experiment examines the 
empirical validity of these predictions by comparing the performance of sequential lending 
and simultaneous lending in the presence of moral hazard and costly peer monitoring. 
  The second issue is whether peer monitoring indeed does better than active lender 
monitoring. The bank or the lender in general is an outsider who often has less information 
about the borrowers. Borrowers usually live near each other and are more likely to have 
closer social ties. Specifically, we study whether in the presence of moral hazard, group 
                                                 
6 Dynamic incentives mean that banks make future loan accessibility contingent on full repayment of the current 
loan to prevent strategic default.   5
lending with peer monitoring does better than individual lending with bank monitoring.
7 In 
practice peer monitoring is usually less costly than direct lender monitoring; indeed, this cost 
advantage is regarded as one of the main benefits of peer monitoring. Hermes and Lensink 
(2007), for example, argue that the higher observed repayment rates in group lending with 
peer monitoring compared to individual lending with lender monitoring is driven by the 
greater effectiveness of screening, monitoring and enforcement within the group due to the 
closer geographical proximity and close social ties between the group members, which 
translate to lower monitoring costs in the case of group lending with peer monitoring 
compared to individual lending with lender monitoring. Nevertheless we also compare credit 
market performance when direct lender monitoring and peer monitoring involve the same 
monitoring cost. This allows us to examine the relative effectiveness of group lending with 
peer monitoring and individual lending with lender monitoring, holding monitoring costs 
constant.    
  The third issue is the relative benefits of individual and group lending. Over the years 
there has been a discernible shift from group lending to individual lending in microfinance 
programs, and there are a number of theoretical reasons that have been advanced to explain 
this shift.
8 First, clients often dislike tensions caused by group lending. Second, low quality 
clients can free-ride off high quality clients leading to an increase in default rates. Third, 
group lending can be more costly for the clients as they often end up repaying the loans of 
their peers. Theoretically the results are mixed.
9  
                                                 
7 Peer monitoring and peer enforcement have been observed to deter free riding in several experiments relating 
to other social dilemma situations, such as common pool resource environments and the voluntary provision of 
public goods. See Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Barr (2001), Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003), 
Walker and Halloran (2004), and Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2006) for experimental evidence. 
8 The terms individual and group lending as defined in this paper essentially correspond to the terms individual 
and group (joint) liability. We use the term group lending to describe the situation where individuals are both 
borrowers and simultaneously guarantors of their partners’ loans.  
9 Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) and Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) argue that group 
lending (joint liability) is just one element in successful microfinance schemes. Chowdhury (2005) argues that 
mere joint liability does not work and he emphasizes the role of dynamic incentives: in his model a combination 
of joint liability and dynamic incentives work best in terms of project choice and repayment. Che (2002) argues   6
Our laboratory experiment is able to address each of these issues. Our results show 
that when monitoring costs are lower for peer monitoring than lender monitoring, group 
lending (with peer monitoring) performs better compared to individual lending (with active 
lender monitoring), reflected in higher loan frequencies and repayment rates. This occurs 
even though repayment rates with individual lending considerably exceed the theoretical 
prediction, which may reflect social preferences such as reciprocity. However if we hold the 
cost of monitoring constant across the different monitoring regimes, then repayment rates are 
modestly higher under individual lending (with active lender monitoring), compared to group 
lending (with peer monitoring). Loan frequencies and monitoring intensity are modestly 
greater with group lending, however. Our results therefore partially corroborate those 
observed in the field by Gine and Karlan (2006) and Kono (2006), who find high 
performance in individual lending schemes. Their explanation is based on Greif (1994), who 
argues that a more individualistic society requires less information among players and is thus 
able to grow faster. However the relative effectiveness of peer versus active lender 
monitoring depends on the cost of monitoring. In the field experiment conducted by Gine and 
Karlan (2006) the existing field centers with group liability loans were converted to 
individual liability loans. Lenders therefore had prior information about the borrowers’ 
characteristics from the group lending field sessions and this could be used in the individual 
lending sessions at no extra cost. As a result the monitoring costs did not necessarily change 
as they moved from group lending to individual lending. Furthermore, participants had some 
experience with group lending before branching off on their own in the individual lending 
schemes. What this suggests is that monitoring costs in that field experiment may have been 
no different under individual lending (with active lender monitoring), compared to group 
                                                                                                                                                        
that joint liability schemes create problems of free-riding and worsen repayment rates, but when projects are 
repeated multiple times, group lending dominates individual lending. Rai and Sjostrom (2004) emphasize the 
importance of cross-reporting in achieving efficiency in group lending.   7
lending (with peer monitoring). Our laboratory experiment results are consistent with that 
interpretation.  
The results from our experiment also show that within group lending, it matters little 
whether loans are made simultaneously or sequentially. Although the dynamic incentives 
provided by sequential lending can improve efficiency relative to simultaneous group 
lending, performance is equivalently high in the two group lending treatments because agents 
tend to play the efficient equilibrium in the simultaneous case.  
While the primary aim of this paper is to analyze innovative lending schemes for 
developing countries, our work can be placed in a more general context. We seek to study 
different organizational forms for financing investments in the presence of borrower moral 
hazard and in situations where there are no assets to provide as collateral. Questions like this 
have been the focus of much of the large corporate finance literature (for example, Hart, 
2001). Joint liability companies have been seen to facilitate lending as the lender could feel 
more protected both by the joint liability and by the incentives created for partners to monitor 
each others’ earning potential. In some situations, however, this organizational structure 
might not be optimal as it increases ex-post hold up problems to the extent that either party 
can always threaten to veto any action and thus force the firm to a standstill. See Aghion and 
Bolton (1992) for a discussion of different kinds of financial contracting schemes.
10     
2.  Theoretical Framework 
Consider a scenario where two borrowers require one unit of capital (say $1) each for 
investing in a particular project. The bank, which provides this capital in the form of a loan, 
can either make the loan to an individual (individual lending) or it can loan to the borrowers 
as a group (group lending). Joint liability for the repayment of the loan exists in the case of 
                                                 
10 There are alternative organizational forms like limited liability (see Basu, 1992) and more recently joint 
benefit schemes (see Bhattacharya, Banerjee and Mukherjee, 2008), however incorporating those issues are 
beyond the scope of this paper.   8
group lending. Borrowers can invest in two different types of projects: one project has a large 
verifiable income and no non-verifiable private benefit, while the other has a large non-
verifiable private benefit and no verifiable income. The bank prefers the first project, where it 
can recoup its investment, but the borrowers prefer the second one. In the absence of 
monitoring, the borrowers will choose to invest in the second project and the bank, knowing 
this, will choose not to make the loan.   
Let us elaborate on the model, which follows Chowdhury (2005) and Ghatak and 
Guinnane (1999). Suppose that there are two borrowers:  1 B  and  2 B . Two projects are 
available to each borrower: project S (verifiable) and project R (non-verifiable). If Project S is 
chosen, the return is H (verifiable by monitoring) and if project R is chosen, then the return is 
b (not verifiable) with bH < . The 1 dollar cost of each project is financed by a loan from the 
bank (or a lender) since the borrowers do not have any funds of their own. When the two 
borrowers ( 1 B  and  2 B ) borrow together as a group, each borrower receives 1 dollar from the 
lender. The amount to be repaid is  ( ) 1 r >  in the case of individual lending or 2r in the case 
of group lending. We assume that this r  is fixed exogenously.  
In the case of the individual lending, if the borrower chooses project S the return to 
the bank is r ; otherwise it is 0. The return to the borrower is Hr −  if the borrower chooses 
project S, and is b  if the borrower chooses project R. We assume that Hrb −< so that 
borrowers prefer project R. Banks on the other hand prefer project S. In the case of group 
lending, if both borrowers choose project S, the return to each borrower is Hr −  and the 
return to the bank is 2r. If both borrowers choose project R, the return to each borrower is b  
and the return to the bank is 0. Finally if one borrower chooses project R and the other 
chooses project S, then due to joint liability the return to the borrower choosing project S is 0 
while that of the borrower choosing project R is b  and the return to the bank is H . We   9
assume that  2 Hr ≤ . In the case of group lending it is therefore in the interest of both the 
bank and the borrowers to ensure that the other member of the group chooses project S.   
An informational asymmetry arises because each borrower knows the type of his own 
project, but the lender or the other borrower in the group (the partner) can find out the 
borrower’s project choice only with costly monitoring. The monitoring process works as 
follows: Borrower i can, by spending an amount  ( ) i cm  in monitoring costs, obtain 
information about the project chosen by the other borrower in his group with probability 
i m [ ] 0,1 ∈ . This information can be used by borrower i to ensure that the other borrower in 
the group chooses project S. The bank (lender) can also acquire this same information by 
spending an amount  () cm λ . We assume that  1 λ ≥  in order to capture the notion that peer 
monitoring is less expensive than monitoring by the bank. We assume a quadratic monitoring 





m cm = . Monitoring level m costs the bank 
2
2
m λ . If the 
borrower  i chooses monitoring level  i m , then with probability  i m  he can force the other 
borrower in the group to choose project S. 
11  
Individual Lending   
First consider individual lending (with bank monitoring). There are three stages to the game.  
Stage 1: Bank chooses whether or not to lend $1 to the borrower. 
Stage 2: Bank chooses the level of monitoring, conditional on deciding to lend. 
Stage 3: Borrower chooses either project R or project S. 
It is straightforward to solve for the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game 







−− , which 
                                                 
11 We could think of different ways in which monitoring works in practice: information acquired by the 
borrowers about each other’s project choice may be passed on to the lender who then uses this information to 
force the borrowers to choose project S. Alternatively, the borrowers can use some form of social sanctions or 
peer punishment to ensure that the other borrower chooses project S.   10
gives 






− , so the bank will provide 






−> i.e. if 
2 2 r λ > . This gives rise to the first proposition: 
Proposition 1: If the costs of monitoring relative to the return are sufficiently low ( )
2
2
r λ < , 
then individual lending is feasible, and the efficient (full monitoring/lending) equilibrium 
exists; otherwise, for monitoring costs above this threshold the unique equilibrium has no 
lending.  
 




r λ > , and call this the individual lending high cost treatment (Treatment 1). In the 
second we set 
2
2
r λ < , and call this the individual lending low cost treatment (Treatment 2).  
Group Lending: Simultaneous 
The sequence of events in group lending is as follows: 
Stage 1: Bank chooses whether or not to lend $2 to the group. There is joint liability, so that 
if one borrower fails to meet his obligations, then if the other borrower has verifiable income 
he must pay back the bank for both borrowers. 
Stage 2: The borrowers simultaneously choose the level of peer monitoring,  i m .  
Stage 3: Both borrowers choose either project R or project S.  
Note that here both monitoring and lending is simultaneous and we call this simultaneous 
group lending (Treatment 3). Again the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium is solved by 
backward induction. Borrower i will choose monitoring  i m  to maximize 
() () () ()
2
11 * 0 1
2
i
ij j i j j
m
mmHr mb m m mb ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −+− +− +− − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
The first order condition is:  ( ) 0 ji mHr m − −= . Likewise the first order condition for 
borrower  j  is:  ( ) 0 ij mH r m −− = . Clearly 
** 0 ij mm = =  is a Nash equilibrium. We call this   11
the inefficient  (zero-monitoring/zero-lending) equilibrium. In this case there is a strategic 
complementarity between the monitoring levels of the two borrowers. A particular borrower 
knows that if the other borrower monitors and he does not, then he will end up with a payoff 
of 0. If however the other borrower does not monitor then he has no incentive to monitor as 
well. Mere joint liability and peer monitoring does not solve the moral hazard problem. 
Remember however that  [ ] 0,1 m∈ . Now consider the reaction function 
( ) ij mm H r =−  of borrower i with respect to that of borrower  j . Since    1 Hr −> (the 
return on project S exceeds the amount that must be repaid), there exists a  1 jj mm =<  (say) 
such that the best response is  1 i m =  for  jj mm ≥ . So the reaction function of borrower i with 
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⎧ ⎡ −∈ ⎣ ⎪ = ⎨
⎤ ∈ ⎪ ⎦ ⎩
 
  In this case 
** ** 1 ij mm ==  is also a Nash equilibrium. We can call this the efficient 
(monitoring/lending) equilibrium. Figure 1 presents the reaction functions for  1.75 Hr −= . It 
is important to note that the reaction functions are upward sloping. We will return to this 
issue when we discuss the estimation results.   
  The bank’s payoffs in these two monitoring game equilibria determine whether it will 
lend. For the inefficient (0,0) case, the expected payoff to the bank is  20 −< and group 
lending is not feasible. The payoff to both borrowers in this case is 0. On the other hand, for 
the efficient 
** **
12 1 mm ==  case, the payoff to the bank is 20 r >  and the payoff to both 
borrowers is  1
2 Hr −− . Clearly 
** **
12 1 mm = =  is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Although 
this also makes it a focal point equilibrium (Schelling, 1980, p. 291), previous experimental   12
evidence indicates that this is not a sufficient condition for “behavioral” equilibrium selection 
(e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990).   
Proposition 2: If  1 H r −≥ and agents coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, 
then under a simultaneous group lending scheme lenders choose to make loans, borrowers 
choose a high level of monitoring and repayment rates are high leading to an efficient 
(monitoring/lending) equilibrium. However, an inefficient zero-monitoring equilibrium with 
no lending also exists. 
 
Group Lending: Sequential 
An alternative to simultaneous lending is to lend sequentially to group members with the 
order chosen randomly. Here initially only one (randomly chosen) member of the group 
receives a loan. Depending on whether this loan is repaid, the bank decides whether or not to 
lend to the other member of the group. This incorporates dynamic incentives, which have 
become increasingly popular among researchers and practitioners in microfinance. The 
sequence of events is as follows:  
Stage 1: Bank chooses whether or not to lend $1 to one of the members of the group. It puts 
the other dollar into alternative use, which yields r  .  
Stage 2: The borrowers simultaneously choose their levels of monitoring mi. 
Stage 3: One of the borrowers is chosen at random (with probability 0.5) to receive the loan, 
if the bank lends. This borrower  i B  decides whether to invest in R or S.  
If  i B  invests in project R, then he gets b and neither  j B  nor the bank receives 
anything. The game stops here. If  i B  invests in project S the game continues to round 2. In 
this case borrower  i B  receives Hr −  and the bank receives r . This amount Hr −  is invested 
and gives ( ) 1 Hr r −<  , so that self financing among the borrowers is not possible. Of course 
if  j B  is successful in her monitoring, then  i B  has to invest in project S.    13
Stage 4: The game moves to round 2 only if  i B  (the randomly chosen first borrower) invests 
in project S in round 1. The bank lends $1 to  j B  who invests in either project R or project S 
(of course if  i B  was successful in her monitoring, then  j B  has to invest in project S).  
If  j B  invests in project R then the bank gets ( ) Hr r −  and  j B  gets b. If  j B  invests in 
project S, then the bank gets r. Total surplus is () ( ) 1 Hr r − +   and this is allocated among the 
two borrowers.  j B  gets  () ( ) 1 Hr r α −+   and  i B  gets () ( ) ( ) 11 Hr r α − −+  .  
Let us assume that  () ( ) 1 Hr r b α − +≥   and () ( ) ( ) 11 Hr r b α − −+ ≥  . There now 
exists a positive level of monitoring irrespective of α  and group lending (with joint liability) 
is a feasible and unique equilibrium outcome. Even though both borrowers still have an 
incentive to choose the non-verifiable project R, the sequential lending increases their 
incentive to monitor. In this case the reaction functions for the two borrowers are symmetric 
and are given by  
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br H r r α
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+− − +   
The expected payoff to the bank is 
1
2
kl k l mmr m m
r
rr
+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠   
Therefore a unique and positive level of monitoring exists, irrespective of the value of 
α . This positive level of monitoring occurs because even if borrower  j B  does not monitor,   14
i B  has an incentive to monitor. To see this, suppose that  j B  receives the loan in round 1 
(remember that the order of receiving the loan is determined randomly). If  i B  does not 
monitor,  j B  will invest in project R and then  i B  will receive a payoff of 0. By choosing a 
positive level of monitoring,  i B  can increase the probability that  j B  invests in project S in 
which case the game continues onto the second round and  i B  gets the loan. Moreover given 
that  i B  is going to monitor,  j B  has an even greater incentive to monitor due to the strategic 
complementarity of monitoring. So the sequential nature of the lending scheme and the 
simultaneous choice of the level of monitoring (before a borrower knows whether he is the 
first or the second borrower) lead to an efficient (monitoring/lending) equilibrium, as long as 
the equilibrium monitoring levels are sufficient to provide positive returns to the lender. This 
is sequential group lending (Treatment 4).   
Proposition  3: If  () () 1 Hr r b α −+ ≥   and () ( ) ( ) 11 Hr r b α − −+ ≥   then under sequential 
group lending, a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which lenders choose to make loans, 
borrowers choose a high level of monitoring and repayment rates are high leading to an 






br H r r α
== =
+− − +  . For the parameters chosen for the 
experiment  1 m = . 
 
3.        Experimental Design 
We designed four treatments to examine the equilibrium predictions described in 
Propositions 1 – 3, and conducted a total of 29 sessions in Australia and India across these 
treatments with 12 subjects in each session. Treatments 1 and 2 were individual lending 
treatments, with the 12 subjects randomly divided into groups of two with each group 
consisting of one borrower and one lender. Treatments 3 and 4 were group lending 
treatments, with the 12 subjects randomly divided into groups of three with each group 
consisting of two borrowers and one lender. The role of each subject (as a borrower or as a   15
lender) was determined randomly and remained the same throughout each session, which ran 
for 40 periods. At the end of every period participants were randomly re-matched. After 
reading the instructions and before the actual session began, the participants answered a set of 
questions relating to the instructions and they were paid in cash (at the end of the experiment 
in addition to their earnings from the actual experiment) A$0.50 or 5 Rupees for each correct 
answer. Subjects earned payments in experimental dollars, which were converted to local 
currency at a fixed and announced exchange rate. 
  The two projects available to borrowers, S and R, each cost $1, to be financed by a 
loan from the lender. In the individual lending treatments, the lender chose whether or not to 
invest $1 into this loan. In the group lending (simultaneous and sequential) treatments, the 
lender chose whether or not to invest $2 into the loan ($1 to each borrower). In this case the 
lender could choose to make the loan to both borrowers or to neither. She could not make a 
loan to only one borrower in the group. If the lender chose not to make the loan, she earned 
$1.50 (or $0.75 in the individual lending treatment) for the period. In the group lending 
treatments, if the borrower received the loan, he could monitor the project choice of the other 
borrower in the group by choosing to pay a monitoring cost (C). Both borrowers could 
monitor each other. If borrower X incurred a cost C on monitoring, there was a chance of M 
that the other borrower Y would automatically be required to choose project S. Otherwise the 
other borrower could choose either project R or project S. In the sequential lending treatment, 
the borrowers were randomly determined to be the first or the second borrower in the group 
to receive the loan. In this case if the first (randomly chosen) borrower’s actual project choice 
was R, then the lender’s second dollar was automatically allocated to her savings account 
where she earned $0.75 for this dollar. All monitoring decisions were made simultaneously. 
The theoretical predictions and the parameter values used are summarized in Table 1 (Panel 
A and Panel B respectively). These parameter values were chosen to satisfy the parameter   16
restrictions in Propositions 1 – 3 and implement a test of the theoretical model, and were not 
calibrated to particular field conditions. These parameters imply specific earnings of the 
borrowers and the lender, shown in Table 2.  It is worth noting that these numbers are gross 
returns. For example, in Table 2, Panel A if the actual project choice for both borrowers is S, 
then the net earnings of the lender is $2.50 – $2.00 = $0.50, i.e., the lender receives a return 
of 25 percent on the $2.00 investment.
12 
We used the strategy method to elicit decisions from the borrowers.
13 The use of this 
method implies that the borrowers and lenders made decisions simultaneously and borrowers 
made their decision before they knew whether or not they had received the loan. In the case 
of sequential lending, the borrowers made monitoring decisions before they knew whether 
they were the first or the second borrower in their group to receive a loan. They did, however, 
know whether they were the first or the second borrower to receive the loan at the time of 
making their project choice.  
  In the individual lending treatments, if the lender decided to invest $1 in a period 
(make the loan), she could monitor the project choice of the borrower by choosing to pay a 
monitoring cost (C). Treatments 1 and 2 differ in the lender’s monitoring costs. In Treatment 
1 the cost of monitoring is significantly higher for the lender, relative to the case of peer 
monitoring, consistent with the standard view that peers can observe each other’s activities 
much more easily than can the lender (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). In Treatment 2 the lender 
faces the same monitoring cost as the peer. Although this is unlikely to be the case in 
practice, this intermediate treatment allows us to compare group and individual lending when 
                                                 
12 It is interesting to note that even though the parameter values were not calibrated to particular field conditions, 
they turn out to be not too distant from some values observed in the field. For example Bellman (2006) reports 
that financial organizations charge around 24% annual interest on loans. Note that while some authors (e.g. 
Ghatak, 2000) assume that the rate of interest is a choice variable for the bank, others (e.g., Besley and Coate, 
1995) assume that it is exogenously determined. In this paper we follow Besley and Coate (1995) and assume 
that the rate of interest is exogenous. Essentially we assume that the government determines the interest rate on 
non-economic grounds.   
13 The strategy method simultaneously asks all players for strategies (decisions at every information set) rather 
than observing each player’s choices only at those information sets that arise in the course of a play of a game. 
This allows us to observe subjects’ entire strategies, rather than just the moves that occur in the game.   17
holding the monitoring cost constant. Lenders paid their selected monitoring costs whenever 
they made the loan, regardless of whether or not the monitoring was successful. If 
unsuccessful, the borrower could choose either project S or project R. All decisions were 
revealed to all members of the two- or three- person group at the end of each period.  
The 348 subjects who participated in the 29 sessions were graduate and undergraduate 
students at Monash University and University of Melbourne, Australia and Jadavpur 
University, Kolkata, India. We conducted sessions in two countries to examine whether 
subjects in India, who are perhaps more exposed to issues relating to microfinance and who 
share more cultural similarities to targeted borrowers, would exhibit behavioral differences 
from the subjects in Australia.
14 All subjects were inexperienced in that they had not 
participated in a similar experiment. Compared to the Australian sample, the Indian sample 
had a lower proportion of females, a greater proportion of Business/Economics/Commerce 
majors, and a higher proportion of subjects who lived in a major metropolis when they were 
aged 15. The z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) was used to conduct the experiment. Each 
session lasted approximately 2 hours, including instruction time. Subjects earned AUD 25 – 
35 or its purchasing power equivalent on average.
15 The instructions (included for the 
simultaneous lending treatment in the appendix) used the borrowing and lending terminology 
employed in this description. 
4.       Hypotheses to be Tested 
The experiments were designed to test the following theoretical hypotheses, which follow 
from propositions 1 – 3: 
Hypothesis 1: The lending rate, the average level of monitoring and the average repayment 
rate are all greater in both the group lending treatments with peer monitoring (Treatments 3 
and 4) compared to individual lending with high cost lender monitoring (Treatment 1).  
                                                 
14 Following Muhammad Yunus being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, microfinance and Grameen 
Bank have received considerable media attention in India and in particular in Kolkata, which has cultural and 
linguistic similarities to Bangladesh. 
15 At the time of the experiment, 4 Australian dollars were worth about 3 U.S. dollars.    18
 
Hypothesis 2: The lending rate, the average level of monitoring and the average repayment 
rate in the simultaneous group lending treatment (Treatment 3) are less than or equal to the 
rates in the sequential group lending treatment (Treatment 4).  
 
Note that the weak inequalities indicated in Hypothesis 2 follow from the theoretical 
predictions and parameter choices, which imply that the efficient (lend/monitor) equilibrium 
is unique in the sequential lending treatment, but both efficient and inefficient (no loan) 
equilibria exist in the simultaneous lending case.  
Hypothesis 3: The lending rate, the average level of monitoring and the average repayment 
rate in the group lending treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) are less than or equal to the rates for 
individual lending with low cost lender monitoring (Treatment 2).  
 
Hypothesis 4: The lending rate, the average level of monitoring and the average repayment 
rate are greater with low cost lender monitoring (Treatment 2) than high cost lender 
monitoring (Treatment 1).  
 
Hypothesis 3 evaluates the impact of group lending compared to individual lending with 
lender monitoring, holding monitoring cost constant. Hypothesis 4 examines the change in 
monitoring cost, holding constant the aspect of individual lending with lender monitoring.  
 
5.   Results 
We present our results in the next three subsections, with each subsection addressing a 
specific aspect of the program performance: lending, monitoring, and repayment (and project 
choice). In each case we present conservative non-parametric tests for treatment differences 
which require minimal statistical assumptions and are based on only one independent 
summary statistic value per session. We also report estimates from multivariate parametric 
regression models which can isolate the contribution of different factors on lender and 
borrower behavior.  
5.1: Lending 
Figure 2 presents the average proportion of lenders making loans in the different periods, by   19
treatment. Clearly the average proportion of lenders making loans is substantially lower at 
every period for treatment 1 (individual lending high cost) but there is very little difference in 
the early periods between treatments 2 (individual lending low cost), 3 and 4 (group lending). 
However the lending rate in the last 5 periods is significantly lower in treatment 2 compared 
to the group lending treatments. These results are supported by non-parametric Mann-
Whitney rank sum tests with the session average as the unit of observation (Table 3, Panel 
A). These non-parametric tests suggest that over time lending rates are modestly lower in 
individual lending compared to group lending even holding monitoring costs constant. 
Differences in monitoring costs across the different monitoring regimes exacerbate the 
differences in lending rates between individual and group lending programs, as the individual 
lending high cost treatment has by far the lowest lending rate.
16  
  Subjects participated in the experiment for 40 periods, allowing us to examine their 
behavior over time more systematically using panel regressions. Table 4 presents the random 
effect probit estimation of the lender’s loan decisions. These panel regressions incorporate a 
random effects error structure, with the subject (lender) representing the random effect. The 
dependent variable is 1 if the lender chooses to lend. We present the results from two 
different specifications. Specification 1 includes a dummy for group lending, and 
specification 2 replaces this with separate dummies for the two group lending treatments. 
Both specifications include a dummy for the individual lending with low cost treatment, and 
the reference category is always individual lending with high cost.  
  The estimates for 1/t and (1/t×INDVLOWCOST) indicate that lending decreased over 
time in the two individual lending treatments, but the (1/t×GROUP) estimates indicate 
                                                 
16 We also conducted a “direct” test of observed behavior against the theoretical predictions in Table 1. Using 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test we always reject the null hypothesis that on average subjects 
behave consistent with theory. This is not too surprising because the theoretical predictions have a boundary 
value (either 0 or 1), so deviations from the predictions can only go in one direction. Behavior, however, often 
moves towards the predictions in the later periods. For example, in Figure 2, average lending rates move 
towards 0 percent in the case of Treatment 1 and towards 100 percent for Treatments 3 and 4 .     20
increased lending over time in the two group lending treatments.
17 The null hypothesis that 
lending rates are not different between the group lending and individual lending with low cost 
treatment is rejected ( ) 0.0001 p value −= .
18 The probability of lending in period t is 
significantly lower if the lender received negative earnings in period  1 t − , which provides 
some simple evidence of a reinforcement-type learning. The Jadavpur University dummy is 
not statistically significant implying that that there is no difference in the probability of 
lending across the two locations. Most of the demographic control variables are not 
statistically significant (the exceptions being the age and the gender of the subject: lending 
rates are higher if the lenders are female and there is an inverted u-shaped relationship 
between the age of the participant and the propensity to make a loan).
19 The results from 
Specification 2 additionally show that there are only marginally statistically significant 
( ) 0.0931 p value −=  treatment differences between the two group lending treatments.  
In summary, we find support for hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, but not for hypothesis 3, for 
the loan frequency comparison. Compared to individual lending with high cost lender 
monitoring (Treatment 1), the lending rate is higher for both the group lending treatments 
with peer monitoring (Treatments 3 and 4) and for individual lending with low cost lender 
                                                 
17 Notice from Figure 2 that the time trend appears similar for the two group lending treatments but is very 
different for the two individual lending treatments. The non-interacted term (1/t) in this case captures the effect 
of time on the propensity of the lender to make a loan in the individual lending treatment with high cost;  the 
interaction term () ( ) 1/t GROUP × captures the differential effect of time on the propensity of the lender to make 
a loan in the group lending treatment and the interaction term ( ) ( ) 1/t INDVLOWCOST × captures the 
differential effect of time on the propensity of the lender to make a loan in the individual lending treatment with 
low cost. To obtain the total effect of time in the group lending treatments we need to add the coefficient 
estimates of (1/t)  and  ( ) ( ) () 1/tG R O U P ×  and to obtain the total effect of time in the individual lending 
treatment with low cost we need to add the coefficient estimates of (1/t) and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/tI N D V L O W C O S T × . The 
coefficient estimates of (1/t) and  ( ) ( ) () 1/tG R O U P ×  are jointly significant as are the coefficient estimates of 
(1/t) and  ( ) ( ) () 1/tI N D V L O W C O S T × .  
18Note that the relevant test here is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/ 1/ tG R O U P tI N D V L O W C O S T ×= ×   and 
; GROUP INDVLOWCOST = , i.e., both the intercept and the slope are different. The test statistics (distributed 
as  ()
2 2 χ  under the null hypothesis) are shown in the lower section of the table. 
19 We do not present the result for these demographic variables to save space. They are available on request.    21
monitoring (Treatment 2). Compared to individual lending with low cost lender monitoring 
(Treatment 2), however, the lending rate is significantly higher for the group lending 
treatments (Treatments 3 and 4). This implies that loans are more frequent with group lending 
than with individual lending, even holding monitoring cost constant. 
5.2: Monitoring 
Figure 3 presents the average level of monitoring across periods. Monitoring rates are 
significantly lower in the high cost treatment (Treatment 1) compared to the low cost 
treatments (Treatments 2, 3 and 4). Controlling for monitoring costs however, there is little 
difference in monitoring rates between individual and group lending. Again using a rank sum 
test with the session average as the unit of observation, the difference in the monitoring rate 
between the group lending treatments and individual lending treatment with low cost and the 
difference in monitoring rates between the two group lending treatments are not statistically 
significant (Table 3, Panel B). Monitoring rates in Treatment 2 are significantly higher 
compared to those in treatments 3 and 4 in the first 5 periods, but this difference appears to be 
transitory and monitoring rates are actually lower in the later periods (though the late period 
difference is not statistically significant). The average monitoring rate is, however, always 
significantly lower for the higher monitoring cost of Treatment 1.
20  
  The monitoring decision is made by the lender in the individual treatments and by a 
peer borrower in the group lending treatments. For the most part therefore we analyze the 
level of monitoring chosen in the individual and group lending treatments separately.
21 The 
                                                 
20 Again using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test we always reject the null hypothesis that on 
average subjects behave in accordance with the (boundary) point predictions of theory. However behavior seems 
to move towards the predictions in the later periods. For example, in Figure 3, average monitoring levels for 
treatment 1 are moving towards 0 and for the other three treatments towards 1.   
21 The propensity to make the loan is significantly lower in the individual lending treatments (particularly in the 
high cost treatment), implying that the data on the level of monitoring is often not observed in the case of 
treatment 1. The panel in this case is therefore unbalanced: the observed number of monitoring choices varies 
from 2 (i.e., in only 2 of the possible 40 cases, did the lender choose to make the loan) to 37.   22
level of monitoring chosen is restricted in the range  [0,1] and is estimated using a tobit 
model. 
  Consider first the level of monitoring chosen (by the lender) in the individual lending 
treatments. Table 5, Panel A, presents the random effects tobit regression results and the 
Hausman-Taylor estimates for error component models.
22 The treatment dummy is positive 
and statistically significant, consistent with Hypothesis 4, indicating that monitoring rates are 
significantly higher in the low monitoring cost condition. Monitoring rates fall over time in 
both treatments and there are significant treatment differences (the coefficient estimates of  
(1/ ) tI N D V L O W C O S T ×  and the treatment dummy are jointly statistically significant 
( ) 0.0001 p value −= ). The level of monitoring in period  1 t −  has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the level of monitoring in period t. The Jadavpur University dummy is 
however positive and statistically significant.
23  
  As mentioned above in the case of group lending (with peer monitoring) the payoff 
for an individual borrower depends both on her level of monitoring and also on the level of 
monitoring of her partner. Subjects could construct expectations for the level of monitoring of 
the other member of the group in different ways. Here we consider the following two simple 
alternatives:  
                                                 
22 The tobit regression results presented in column (1) fail to account for the possibility that the lagged 
dependent variable (lagged level of monitoring) can be correlated with the time invariant component of the error 
term (the unobserved individual level random effect). Ignoring this could result in biased estimates. One way of 
obtaining unbiased estimates would be to use instrumental variables estimation (see Hausman and Taylor, 
1981). It is assumed that none of the covariates are correlated with the idiosyncratic error term. The results for 
the Hausman-Taylor estimation for error component models are presented in Table 5, Panel A, column (2). 
Qualitatively the results are very similar to the tobit regression results presented in column (1): in particular, the 
greater the level of monitoring in period  1 t − , the greater the level of monitoring in period t  and the level of 
monitoring falls over time. Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee we also estimated the monitoring 
regressions with the previous period project chosen by the borrower (other borrower in the group if group 
lending), rather than lagged monitoring. The results indicate that previous period non-verifiable project choices 
are associated with higher monitoring rates in the current period (though in the group lending treatment the 
effects are not statistically significant). We do not include these additional regressions in this version of the 
paper, because of the additional length they would add. They are however available on request. 
23 It is interesting to note that if we restrict the sample to those born in South Asia (whether residing in Australia 
or India), the Jadavpur University dummy is no longer statistically significant. Twenty of the 240 subjects 
participating in the sessions conducted in Australia were born in South Asia.   23
(1) Cournot expectations: each subject expects the monitoring level of the other member of 
the group to be the same as that in the previous period (Lagged Monitoring of the Other 
Borrower); 
 
(2) Fictitious play: each subject expects the monitoring level of the other member of the 
group to be the average over all the previous periods (Average Lagged Monitoring of the 
Other Borrower). Hence each subject is assumed to have a long memory as opposed to 
the Cournot expectations case where each subject has a short memory.  
 
Table 5, Panel B, presents the random effects tobit and the Hausman-Taylor estimation for 
error component models for both specifications of expectation formation in the group lending 
treatment. We find that monitoring increased over time and is modestly higher with 
sequential lending. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The positive and significant 
coefficient estimate of the other borrower’s lagged monitoring level (in the Cournot 
expectations version) or its counterpart lagged average other borrower’s monitoring (in the 
fictitious play version) is consistent with the upwardly-sloped reaction functions of the 
theoretical model. Note that the coefficient estimate on a borrower’s own monitoring in the 
previous period is also positive, and is substantially larger than the reaction to the other 
borrower’s monitoring level. The Jadavpur University dummy is always negative but is 
statistically significant only in one case (Hausman-Taylor specification with fictitious play).
24 
Estimates for the demographic controls (not shown) indicate that females choose a 
significantly lower level of monitoring, as do subjects with no previous participation 
experience.  
  Table 5, Panel C compares the level of monitoring chosen in the low cost treatments 
(Treatments 2, 3 and 4). We present the random effects tobit and the Hausman-Taylor 
estimation for error component model regression results for two different specifications: in 
specification 1 we include a group lending treatment dummy as defined above while in 
specification 2 we include separate dummies for the sequential and simultaneous lending 
                                                 
24 Again if we restrict the sample to those born in South Asia (whether residing in Australia or India), the 
Jadavpur University dummy is no longer statistically significant.     24
treatments and the corresponding time interaction terms. The reference category in both cases 
is the individual lending low cost treatment. These estimations compare across lender and 
peer monitoring, holding the cost of monitoring constant. Note that specification 1 indicates a 
significantly different (upward) time trend for group lending, but the joint test 
(1/ ) 0 t INDVLOWCOST ×=  and the treatment dummy = 0 cannot be rejected 
( ) 0.1078 p value −=  for the tobit regression. Specification 1 does indicate differences in 
monitoring between individual and group lending for the Hausman-Taylor model, and 
specification 2 shows that this is due to the greater monitoring rate in sequential lending. 
In summary, we find support for hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 but not for hypothesis 3 for the 
monitoring rates comparison. Compared to the individual lending with high cost lender 
monitoring (Treatment 1), the monitoring rate is significantly higher for  both the group 
lending treatments with peer monitoring (Treatments 3 and 4) and for individual lending with 
low cost lender monitoring (Treatment 2). Compared to individual lending with low cost 
lender monitoring (Treatment 2), the monitoring rate is a bit higher for the sequential group 
lending (Treatment 4). This difference, which is contrary to Hypothesis 3, is only statistically 
significant in the panel regressions.  
5.3: Repayment Rate 
The repayment rate is not a choice variable but is the result of a combination of the ex ante 
project choice by the borrower, the level of monitoring chosen by the borrower, and the 
success of the monitoring process. Repayment occurs if the borrower chooses project S or if 
the borrower chooses project R and monitoring is successful. Panel C of Table 3 shows that 
repayment rates, like the other performance measures, are not significantly different across 
the two group lending treatments. Repayment rates are significantly lower in the individual 
lending high cost treatment compared to all three low monitoring cost treatments. The 
average proportion of subjects (ex ante) choosing project R is significantly lower, however, in   25
both the individual lending treatments compared to the group lending treatments (Panel D of 
Table 3).
25    
  Table 6 presents random effect probit regression results for repayment (columns 1 and 
2) and ex ante choice of project R (columns 3 and 4). The explanatory variables are the same 
as in Table 5 and again as before we present the results from two alternative specifications. 
The repayment rates (Table 6, column 1) are not significantly different in the group lending 
treatments compared to the individual lending low cost treatment: the joint test of equality of 
the two treatment dummies and (1/ ) (1/ ) t GROUP t INDVLOWCOST × =×  cannot be rejected 
( ) 0.1028 p value −=  indicating that over all, group lending and individual lending with low 
cost treatments have similar effects on repayment. Column 2 indicates that repayment is 
lower for simultaneous group lending than for low cost individual lending.  
Recall that the earnings of the borrower are greater if he chooses project R, but the 
earnings of the lender are lower if the borrowers choose project R. Columns 3 and 4 indicate 
that the borrowers are more likely to choose project R in the group lending Treatments 3 and 
4 than in the individual lending Treatments 1 and 2. Table 5 earlier showed that borrowers in 
these group lending treatments are also more likely to choose a high level of monitoring to be 
able to switch the other borrower’s project choice to S. In consequence the “actual project 
choices” are likely to be project S and the earnings of the lenders are positive and outcomes 
move toward an efficient (monitoring/lending) equilibrium. On the other hand in Treatment 1 
monitoring rates are lower and even though borrowers are more likely to choose project S, 
lenders choose not to make the loan. Outcomes frequently correspond to the inefficient (low 
monitoring/no lending) equilibrium. Finally comparing Treatment 3 to Treatment 2, when 
holding monitoring cost constant the repayment rates are significantly higher in the individual 
lending treatment compared to the simultaneous group lending treatment. Since monitoring 
                                                 
25 Again using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test we always reject the null hypothesis that on 
average subjects behave in accordance with the (boundary) point predictions of the theory.   26
rates are not different across these treatments (Table 5C), the difference is driven by the fact 
that borrowers are significantly more likely to (ex ante) choose project R in this group 
lending treatment compared to the individual lending treatment.   
In summary, we find support for hypotheses 2 through 4 but only partial support for 
Hypothesis 1 for repayment rates. Compared to individual lending with high cost lender 
monitoring (Treatment 1), the repayment is significantly higher for the sequential group 
lending treatment (Treatment 4) and for individual lending with low cost lender monitoring 
(Treatment 2), but is not significantly different for the simultaneous group lending treatment 
(Treatment 3). Compared to the sequential group lending treatment (Treatment 4), the 
repayment rate is significantly lower for the simultaneous group lending treatment 
(Treatment 3); and compared to individual lending with low cost lender monitoring 
(Treatment 2), the repayment rate is significantly lower for the simultaneous group lending 
treatment (Treatment 3).  
One possible explanation for the lower rate that borrowers chose project R in the 
individual lending treatments could be that reciprocal motivations are triggered more in a two 
person game (Treatments 1 and 2) than a three person game (Treatments 3 and 4).  Individual 
lending in the experiment shares some parallels with the trust game (e.g., McCabe, Rigdon 
and Smith, 2003). When the lender trusts the borrower with the loan, the borrower is more 
likely to choose the verifiable project. Subjects appear to be less likely to exhibit reciprocal 
behavior when a fellow borrower is monitoring and can also compensate the lender for any 
bad outcomes. In other words, it is possible that the group lending environment reduced the 
borrower’s feeling of responsibility to be reciprocal.
 26  
                                                 
26 An anonymous referee suggests that we include an indication of whether or not the lender provided a loan in 
the previous period in the regressions. When we included this variable in the regression (instead of the lagged 
project choice), we find that surprisingly the probability of choosing a non-verifiable project is significantly 
higher if the borrower received a loan in the previous period. The probability of repayment is, however, not 
affected by whether or not the borrower received a loan in the previous period. These results are available on 
request.    27
6.         Implication of our Results and some Concluding Comments 
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to examine group lending in the presence of 
moral hazard and costly lender or peer monitoring. We compare treatments when credit is 
provided to members of the same group sequentially and simultaneously, and when loans are 
given to individuals and monitored by lenders. The results depend on the relative cost of 
monitoring by the peer vis-à-vis the outside lender. If (as is generally assumed), the cost of 
peer monitoring is lower than the cost of outside lender monitoring, then our results suggest 
that in the presence of moral hazard, peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies, 
higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to bank monitoring. This occurs 
even though repayment rates with individual lending considerably exceed the theoretical 
prediction, which may reflect social preferences such as reciprocity. However in the absence 
of cost differences, individual lending with lender monitoring performs similar to group 
lending and monitoring. Loan frequencies and monitoring rates are sometimes modestly 
greater with group lending, however, even for equivalent monitoring costs.  
Over the years there has been a discernible shift from group lending to individual 
lending in microfinance programs and there are a number of theoretical reasons that have 
been advanced to explain this shift. Theoretically the results are mixed. Our results suggest 
that monitoring costs could help in determining performance. In one of our treatments we 
assume similar costs for peer and lender monitoring. As discussed above and discussed in 
detail in Hermes and Lensink (2007), equivalent cost structures across the two monitoring 
regimes are unlikely in practice. Screening, monitoring and enforcement are more effective 
within the group due to the closer geographical proximity and close social ties between the 
group members, which translates into lower monitoring costs in the case of group lending 
with peer monitoring compared to individual lending with lender monitoring. If one could 
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design contracts that reduced the cost of monitoring by the outside lender then there would be 
much less reason to choose group lending over individual lending.
27 In the absence of such a 
contract, monitoring costs are higher under individual lending with lender monitoring. If this 
is the case, our results support the conclusion that group lending (with peer monitoring) 
remains the preferred means of credit provision.  
While our experiment is able to shed light on several important issues relating to the 
design of microcredit programs, it is necessarily restrictive. For example, we do not consider 
the effect of group size. Group size may be of considerable importance in the simultaneous 
group lending model, where the inefficient (zero-monitoring/zero-lending) equilibrium can 
arise because of free riding on the part of the two borrowers in the group. We do not find 
evidence of free riding in the two person groups that we consider, as play converges toward 
the payoff dominant efficient (monitoring/lending) equilibrium. Borrowers might free ride if 
they are a part of a larger group, especially given that there is no explicit punishment. In this 
framework with mutual (peer) monitoring, however, as the size of the group increases so do 
the number of people who monitor. If most people monitor, then the likelihood of being 
caught free riding is also higher and so is the opportunity to sanction. For example Carpenter 
(2007) finds that the extent of free riding with potential sanctions is no greater in larger 
groups, because the extent of monitoring and punishment is not negatively correlated with the 
size of the group. This explains the existence of large productive teams, particularly if there is 
transparency in the production process. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2006) found that the 
performance of experimental microcredit groups is robust to group size. While the larger 
                                                 
27 For example in the field experiment conducted by Gine and Karlan (2006) in the Philippines,  the existing 
field centres with group liability loans were converted to individual liability loans; lenders therefore had prior 
information about the borrowers’ characteristics from the group lending field sessions and this could be used in 
the individual lending sessions at no extra cost. As a result the monitoring costs did not necessarily change as 
they moved from group lending to individual lending. Alternatively, when a formal financial institution engages 
a member of the community to act as an intermediary/agent for screening and monitoring, since this local 
member has more information about the potential borrowers compared to the outside lender, the monitoring 
costs associated with this kind of an arrangement is no higher than that under peer monitoring (see for example 
Fuentes, 1996). Of course, in this case the gain from reduced monitoring cost has to be weighed against the cost 
of the payment made to this external agent.   29
groups do have a slightly higher tendency towards free riding, the superior dispersion of risk 
in the larger groups makes them perform as well as the smaller groups in that experiment. It 
is to be noted that these results are specific to the design and the chosen parameter 
constellation.   
  We have also not considered the possibility of group lending with active bank 
monitoring in this paper. As a purely theoretical construct, consider the following sequence 
of events (see Chowdhury, 2005). First the bank decides whether or not to lend $2 to the 
group, which is divided equally among the two borrowers. Second, the bank decides on its 
level of monitoring. Let  i M  denote the level at which the bank monitors the i
th borrower. 
Then with probability  i M  the bank gets to know the identity of the i
th borrower’s project and 
it passes on this information to both borrowers. Third, the borrowers simultaneously decide 
on their monitoring levels  1 m  and  2 m . Finally, both borrowers invest $1 into one of the two 
projects. If there is no joint liability, borrowers have no incentive to invest in peer 
monitoring. However if there is joint liability, then the equilibrium involves a positive level 
of monitoring by the bank and this has a pump-priming effect: by undertaking relatively 
costly monitoring itself, the bank induces more efficient monitoring by the borrowers 
themselves. It is difficult however to justify this kind of a lending-monitoring scheme from 
the point of view of resource use. A key advantage of group lending with peer monitoring is 
that banks are able to transfer the cost of monitoring to the group members who are likely to 
do it relatively cheaply (at least compared to the bank).   
Much of the success of microcredit programs has been attributed to self-selected 
groups and social ties in rural communities. However successful application of these 
programs in other scenarios and economies requires more than strong social ties. In urban 
contexts of developing and transitional economies, for example, it might be more difficult to 
form self-selected borrowing groups compared to the more closely knit rural communities.   30
For this reason several authors and policy makers suggest that optimal design of microcredit 
programs look beyond the issue of self-selection and even look beyond group lending. This 
experiment focuses on informational asymmetries due to moral hazard and restricts attention 
to exogenously formed groups. The results show that in the presence of moral hazard group 
lending performs better compared to individual lending, even with no self-selection in group 
formation. Introducing dynamic incentives (within group lending) helps, but only modestly 
and only for repayment rates. Overall, performance differences are minor between 
simultaneous and sequential lending. What is important is peer monitoring, which works 
much better than active lender monitoring.
28 Optimal design of microcredit programs needs 
to take advantage of the fact that it is less costly for group members to monitor each other, 
which can result in better project choices and higher repayment rates.   
 
                                                 
28 It has been observed that in the absence of peer monitoring the success of such programs is quite limited. See 
Bhatt and Tang (2002) for evidence using data from microcredit programs in the US.     31
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions and Parameter Values in the Different Treatments 
 
Panel A: Theoretical Predictions for Chosen Parameters 
 

















Make Loan  No  Yes  No/Yes  Yes 
Monitoring Rate  0  1  0/1  1 
(Exante) Project 
Choice 
R R R/R R 
 
 
Panel B: Parameter Values 
 















H   4 4  4  4 
b   2.5 2.5  2.5  2.5 
r   2.25 2.25  2.25  2.25 
λ   4.5 1  1  1 
r    - -  - 0.5 
α   - -  - 0.5 
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Table 2: Earnings of Borrowers and Lenders 
 
 













S  S   $1.75 – C1  $1.75 – C2 $2.50 
S  R  $0.00 – C1  $2.50 – C2 $2.00 
R  S  $2.50 – C1  $0.00 – C2 $2.00 
R  R  $2.50 – C1  $2.50 – C2 -$2.00 
No loan is provided  $0.00  $0.00  $1.50 
 
Panel B: Treatment 4 (Sequential Group Lending) 
Actual project 
choice of the first 
borrower 
Actual project 
choice of the 
second 
borrower 






S  S  $1.75 – C1  $1.75 – C2 $2.50 
S  R  $0.00 – C1  $2.50 – C2 $2.00 
R  S  $2.50 – C1  $0.00 – C2 -$0.25 
R  R  $2.50 – C1  $0.00 – C2 -$0.25 
No loan  is provided  $0.00  $0.00  $1.50 
Note: C1 and C2 denote the monitoring costs incurred by borrower 1 and 2, and this cost depends on 






Panel C: Treatments 1 and 2 (Individual Lending) 
Actual project choice of 
borrower 
Earnings of borrower  Earnings of lender 
S  $1.75  $1.25 – C 
R  $2.50  –$1.00 – C 
No loan is provided  $0.00  $0.75 
 
 
Note: C denotes the monitoring cost incurred by the lender, and this cost depends on monitoring m∈[0,1] 






= .. ;  4.5 λ =  in the high cost monitoring Treatment 1 and  1 λ =  in the low cost 
monitoring Treatment 2  
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Table 3: Selected Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Average Proportion Making Loans 
  Full Sample  First 5 periods  Last 5 periods 
Individual Lending High Cost Treatment 
(Treatment 1) 
0.4738 0.5875  0.3026 
Individual Lending Low Cost Treatment 
(Treatment 2) 
0.6850 0.8000  0.6200 
Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 3) 
0.8115 0.7563  0.8013 
Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 4) 
0.7369 0.7000  0.7885 
Group Lending Treatments  
(Treatments 3 and 4) 
0.7747 0.7281  0.7949 
Rank sum Test        
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) 
-2.342** -2.432**  -2.580*** 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) = 
Group Lending (T3 & T4) 
-1.405 0.705  -1.910* 
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Group Lending (T3& T4) 
-3.124*** -1.965**  -3.381*** 
Simultaneous Lending (T3) = Sequential 
Lending (T4) 
0.684 0.582  -0.318 
 
Panel B. Average Level of Monitoring 
  Full Sample  First 5 periods  Last 5 periods 
Individual Lending High Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 1) 
0.3425 0.4234 0.2681 
Individual Lending Low Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 2) 
0.5881 0.6292 0.6140 
Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 3) 
0.5750 0.5281 0.6628 
Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 4) 
0.6430 0.4996 0.7093 
Group Lending Treatments  
(Treatments 3 and 4) 
0.6069 0.5144 0.6859 
Rank sum Test        
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) 
-2.928*** -2.928*** -2.928*** 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) = 
Group Lending (T3 & T4) 
-0.330 2.064** -1.404 
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Group Lending (T3& T4) 
-3.613*** -1.408 -3.735*** 
Simultaneous Lending (T3) = 
Sequential Lending (T4) 
-0.840 0.0000 -1.105 
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Panel C. Average Repayment Rates 
  Full Sample  First 5 periods  Last 5 periods 
Individual Lending High Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 1) 
0.5828 0.6241 0.4203 
Individual Lending Low Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 2) 
0.7259 0.6917 0.7097 
Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 3) 
0.6535 0.6322 0.7200 
Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 4) 
0.6890 0.6429 0.7520 
Group Lending Treatments  
(Treatments 3 and 4) 
0.6712 0.6373 0.7359 
Rank sum Test        
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) 
-2.928*** -1.761* -2.650*** 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) = 
Group Lending (T3 & T4) 
1.156 1.404 -0.911 
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Group Lending (T3& T4) 
-2.481** -0.092  -3.402*** 
Simultaneous Lending (T3) = 
Sequential Lending (T4) 
-0.525 -0.420 0.211 
 
Panel D. Average Proportion Choosing the Non-Verifiable Project R 
  Full Sample  First 5 periods  Last 5 periods 
Individual Lending High Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 1) 
0.6289 0.6667 0.6623 
Individual Lending Low Cost 
Treatment (Treatment 2) 
0.7008 0.8067 0.6933 
Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 3) 
0.7979 0.7219 0.8718 
Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Treatment 4) 
0.7951 0.6906 0.8462 
Group Lending Treatments  
(Treatments 3 and 4) 
0.7965 0.7063 0.8590 
Rank sum Test        
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) 
-1.171 -1.848* -0.220 
Individual Lending Low Cost (T2) = 
Group Lending (T3 & T4) 
-2.065** 1.865* -1.987** 
Individual Lending High Cost (T1) = 
Group Lending (T3& T4) 
-3.185*** -0.675 -2.670*** 
Simultaneous Lending (T3) = 
Sequential Lending (T4) 
0.053 0.053 0.792 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     35
Table 4: Random Effect Probit Regressions for Making Loans 
 Specification  1  Specification 2 
1/t 1.9116***  1.9102*** 
 (0.3472)  (0.3472) 
1/t × GROUP  -2.4356***   
 (0.4914)   
1/t × INDVLOWCOST  0.2450  0.2445 
 (0.6218)  (0.6216) 
1/t × GROUP_SIMUL    -1.6209** 
   (0.6809) 
1/t × GROUP_SEQUEN    -2.9393*** 
   (0.5639) 
Group Lending Treatment (Dummy)  1.1858***   
 (0.1829)   
Simultaneous Lending Treatment (Dummy)    1.2652*** 
   (0.2216) 
Sequential Lending Treatment (Dummy)    1.0857*** 
   (0.2174) 
Individual Lending Low Cost Treatment (Dummy)  0.8338***  0.8261*** 
 (0.2564)  (0.2554) 
Negative Earnings in Previous Period (Dummy)  -0.3583***  -0.3551*** 
 (0.0525)  (0.0526) 
Session at Jadavpur University (Dummy)  -0.2655  -0.2612 
 (0.1835)  (0.1829) 
Constant 5.3617**  5.3303** 
 (2.3990)  (2.3886) 
Observations 5282  5282 
Number of groups (session subject)  138  138 
σu  0.7928*** 0.7889*** 
  (0.0585) (0.0583) 
ρ  0.3859*** 0.3836*** 
 (0.0350)  (0.0349) 
LR Test for ρ = 0  922.03*** 908.99*** 
Treatment Effects (Joint Significance)     
Group Lending = Individual Lending Low Cost   18.78***   
Sequential Lending = Simultaneous Lending     4.79* 
Sequential Lending = Individual Lending Low Cost     21.83*** 
Simultaneous Lending = Individual Lending Low Cost     6.65** 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
ρ denotes the fraction of total variance due to the time invariant component of the error term. 
Regressions control for a set of demographic characteristics: proportion of correct answers in quiz, age and 
square of age of subject, gender of subject, whether subject is Business/Economics/Commerce major, 
location of residence when aged 15, year at university and previous experience in terms of participation in 
economic experiments.  
Treatment effects (Test for joint significance of the dummy and the interaction term with (1/t)) is  ( )
2 2 χ .  36
Table 5: Level of Monitoring Chosen.  
Panel A: Individual Lending (Lender Monitoring) 
  Random Effect Tobit 
Regression 
Hausman-Taylor 
Estimation for Error 
Component Models 
1/t 0.1871**  0.1709** 
 (0.0830)  (0.0763) 
1/t × INDVLOWCOST  -0.1318  -0.1277 
 (0.1155)  (0.1056) 
Individual Lending Low Cost Treatment (Dummy)  0.1659***  0.1278* 
 (0.0385)  (0.0657) 
Lagged Monitoring  0.4410***  0.3063*** 
 (0.0342)  (0.0290) 
Session at Jadavpur University (Dummy)  0.0853**  0.1158** 
 (0.0343)  (0.0524) 
Constant 0.1497  4.2384 
 (0.3511)  (3.2622) 
Observations 1239  1239 
Number of groups (session subject)  77  77 
σu  0.0682*** 0.1180 
  (0.0109)  
σe  0.2102*** 0.1874 
  (0.0048)  
ρ  0.0952 0.2838 
  (0.0283)  
LR Test for σu = 0  32.20***  
Left censored observations  123   
Uncensored observations  1084   
Right censored observations  32   
Treatment Effect (Joint Significance)  18.71***  4.56 
 Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  
ρ denotes the fraction of total variance due to the time invariant component of the error term. 
Regressions control for a set of demographic characteristics: proportion of correct answers in quiz, age and 
square of age of subject, gender of subject, whether subject is Business/Economics/Commerce major, 
location of residence when aged 15, year at university and previous experience in terms of participation in 
economic experiments.  
Treatment effects (Test for joint significance of the dummy and the interaction term with (1/t)) is  ( )
2 2 χ .  37
Table 5 (continued): Level of Monitoring Chosen.  
Panel B: Group Lending (Peer Monitoring) 



















1/t  0.0061 -0.0097 0.0052 -0.0074 
  (0.0809) (0.0617) (0.0814) (0.0622) 
1/t ×GROUP_SEQUEN -0.2913***  -0.3041***  -0.2780**  -0.2871*** 
  (0.1104) (0.0847) (0.1113) (0.0856) 
0.0543* 0.0579** 0.0533* 0.0597**  Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Dummy)  (0.0292) (0.0238) (0.0297) (0.0241) 
Lagged Own Monitoring  0.5035***  0.3493***  0.4955***  0.3395*** 
  (0.0216) (0.0158) (0.0218) (0.0160) 
0.1313*** 0.1038***      Lagged Monitoring of the Other 
Borrower (0.0184)  (0.0140)     
   0.2679***  0.2440***  Average Lagged Monitoring of 
the Other Borrower      (0.0557)  (0.0433) 
-0.0494 -0.0454 -0.0512  -0.0570**  Session at Jadavpur University 
(Dummy)  (0.0323) (0.0283) (0.0329) (0.0286) 
Constant -0.2964  -0.5616 -0.3915  -3.0257 
 (0.9435)  (2.2314) (0.9601)  (2.3108) 
Observations  3530 3530 3530 3530 
Number of groups (session 
subject) 
120 120 120 120 
σu  0.1225*** 0.0998 0.1249*** 0.1008 
  (0.0107)  (0.0107)  
σe  0.3000*** 0.2368 0.3011*** 0.2376 
  (0.0045)  (0.0045)  
ρ  0.1429*** 0.1509 0.1469*** 0.1525 
  (0.0216)  (0.0218)  
LR Test for σu = 0  190.97***  202.05***  
Left  censored  observations  337  337  
Uncensored  observations  2634  2634  
Right censored observations   559     559   
Treatment Effect (Joint 
Significance) 
8.07** 14.82*** 7.30** 13.53*** 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
ρ denotes the fraction of total variance due to the time invariant component of the error term. 
Regressions control for a set of demographic characteristics: proportion of correct answers in quiz, age and 
square of age of subject, gender of subject, whether subject is Business/Economics/Commerce major, 
location of residence when aged 15, year at university and previous experience in terms of participation in 
economic experiments.  
Treatment effects (Test for joint significance of the dummy and the interaction term with (1/t)) is  ( )
2 2 χ .  38
Table 5 (continued): Level of Monitoring Chosen.  
Panel C: Comparing Peer Monitoring and Lender Monitoring with Low Cost 
  Random Effects Tobit 
Regression 
Hausman-Taylor 










1/t 0.0679  0.0682  0.0164  0.0247 
  (0.1112) (0.1110) (0.0930) (0.0904) 
1/t × GROUP  -0.2596**    -0.2206**   
  (0.1233)  (0.1028)  
0.0311   0.1053*    Group Lending Treatment (Dummy) 
(0.0423)  (0.0587)  
1/t × GROUP_SIMUL    -0.1032    -0.0710 
   (0.1326)  (0.1072) 
1/t × GROUP_SEQUEN    -0.4348***    -0.4102*** 
   (0.1351)  (0.1097) 
 0.0005  0.0464  Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Dummy)   (0.0462)  (0.0604) 
 0.0541   0.0974*  Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Dummy)   (0.0433)  (0.0552) 
Lagged Own Monitoring  0.5148***  0.5098***  0.3564***  0.3533*** 
  (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0153) (0.0149) 
-0.0467 -0.0501* -0.0089  -0.0211  Session at Jadavpur University 
(Dummy)  (0.0290) (0.0293) (0.0319) (0.0314) 
Constant 0.4833  0.4730  13.1844**  8.6271 
  (0.6896) (0.6894) (5.8950) (5.4271) 
Observations  4191 4191 4191 4191 
Number of groups (session subject)  150  150  150  150 
σu  0.1212*** 0.1212***  0.1195  0.1189 
 (0.0094)  (0.0094)     
σe  0.2876*** 0.2870***  0.2316  0.2311 
 (0.0039)  (0.0039)     
ρ  0.1509*** 0.1514***  0.2102  0.2092 
 (0.0202)  (0.0204)     
LR Test for ρ = 0  241.25*** 242.96***     
Left censored observations  392  392     
Uncensored observations  3215  3215     
Right censored observations  584  584     
Treatment Effects (Joint 
Significance): 
    
Group Lending  4.45    7.13**   
Simultaneous Group Lending    0.65    0.93 
Sequential Group Lending    10.44***    15.67*** 
Sequential Lending = Simultaneous 
Lending  
 10.93***  17.14*** 
 Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
ρ denotes the fraction of total variance due to the time invariant component of the error term. 
Regressions control for a set of demographic characteristics: proportion of correct answers in quiz, age and 
square of age of subject, gender of subject, whether subject is Business/Economics/Commerce major, 
location of residence when aged 15, year at university and previous experience in terms of participation in 
economic experiments.  
Treatment effects (Test for joint significance of the dummy and the interaction term with (1/t)) is  ( )
2 2 χ .  39
Table 6: Random Effect Probit Regressions for Repayment and Choice of Non-Verifiable Project (R) 








1/t -0.0560  -0.0566  0.3716**  0.3715** 
  (0.2267) (0.2265) (0.1885)  (0.1885) 
1/t × GROUP  -0.1127    -1.3089***   
  (0.2650)  (0.2247)   
1/t × INDVLOWCOST  -0.2510  -0.2505  0.3466  0.3471 
  (0.3345) (0.3343) (0.3303)  (0.3303) 
1/t × GROUP_SIMUL    0.0202    -1.3996*** 
   (0.3001)   (0.2612) 
1/t × GROUP_SEQUEN    -0.2422    -1.2332*** 
   (0.2965)   (0.2512) 
Group Lending Treatment (Dummy)  0.2140**    0.8127***   
  (0.0839)  (0.1451)   
 0.1177   0.9013***  Simultaneous Lending Treatment 
(Dummy)   (0.0931)   (0.1689) 
 0.3062***   0.7363***  Sequential Lending Treatment 
(Dummy)   (0.0921)   (0.1629) 
0.4912*** 0.5105***  0.4562* 0.4365*  Individual Lending Low Cost 
Treatment  (Dummy)  (0.1398) (0.1382) (0.2595)  (0.2600) 
Session at Jadavpur University  -0.0823  -0.0989  -0.2573*  -0.2390 
  (0.0785) (0.0778) (0.1470)  (0.1481) 
Constant -0.2677  -0.4074  1.0843  1.1770 
  (1.5764) (1.5533) (3.0383)  (3.0354) 
Observations  5330 5330 7732  7732 
Number of groups (session subject)  198  198  198  198 
σu  0.3353*** 0.3269*** 0.7741***  0.7727*** 
  (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0502)  (0.0501) 
ρ  0.1011 0.0966***  0.3747***  0.3738*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0304)  (0.0303) 
LR Test for ρ = 0  122.86*** 111.63***  1108.10***  1105.52*** 
Treatment Effects (Joint 
Significance): 
     
Group Lending = Individual 
Lending Low Cost  
4.55   31.51***   
Sequential Lending = Simultaneous 
Lending  
 5.23*   1.27 
Sequential Lending = Individual 
Lending Low Cost  
 2.58   24.96*** 
Simultaneous Lending = Individual 
Lending Low Cost  
 8.10***   29.73*** 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
ρ denotes the fraction of total variance due to the time invariant component of the error term. 
Regressions control for a set of demographic characteristics: proportion of correct answers in quiz, age and 
square of age of subject, gender of subject, whether subject is Business/Economics/Commerce major, 
location of residence when aged 15, year at university and previous experience in terms of participation in 
economic experiments.  
Treatment effects (Test for joint significance of the dummy and the interaction term with (1/t)) is  ( )
2 2 χ .   40
 
Figure 1: Reaction Functions in Simultaneous lending. Note that reaction functions intersect in two 
places (at (0, 0) and at (1, 1)), which leads to multiple equilibria. 
    ( 0 ,   0 )    ( 1 ,   1 )  
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